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Abstract This paper deals with an at first sight surprising reading that indicative
conditionals whose antecedents contain vague predicates receive under certain
conditions. I argue that the existence of this reading can be explained if indicative
conditionals are allowed to receive a special kind of metalinguistic interpretation.
According to this reading, the worlds quantified over do not (possibly) differ from
the world of evaluation with respect to some extralinguistic state of affairs, but
only with respect to the standards according to which the vague predicates in the
antecedents are interpreted. I show that the availability of the metalinguistic reading
can be accounted for if both the epistemic modal bases and the selection function
relative to which the worlds quantified over are determined are allowed to operate in
a more flexible way than is standardly assumed.
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1 Introduction: the puzzle
Consider the conditionals in (1). They all have prominent readings that can be
paraphrased as in (2):
(1) a. If I hate anything, it’s bad acting.
b. If anyone was drunk at last night’s party, it was Mary.
c. If any book impressed me, it was Ulysses.
(2) a. What I hate most is bad acting.
b. The drunkest person at last night’s party was Mary.
c. The book that impressed me most was Ulysses.
As the paraphrases suggest, the sentences are compatible with, i.e. can be true in
a situation where it is clear that there is more than one thing that the speaker hates,
more than one person that was drunk at last night’s party, etc. The conditional in
(1b), for example, could naturally be uttered in a situation where two people, say
Jack and Jill, are talking about a party they both attended on the prior evening, and
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where Jill just said that their common friends Bob and Mary were both drunk at
the end of the party. The crucial point is that by uttering (1b) in response to Jill’s
claim, Jack does not necessarily express his disagreement, i.e. he may well agree
that Bob and Mary were drunk and just wants to say that Mary was the drunkest of
them all. Similar scenarios can easily be construed for (1a) and (1c). The examples
in (1) all have a cleft-like structure. This is evidenced by the fact that the pronoun
preceding the copula in the consequent has to be a neuter pronoun, no matter what
the gender of the individual referred to by the post-copular DP is. This holds even in
cases where the any-phrase in the antecedent already indicates that the individual
referred to by the post-copular DP is male or female:
(3) a. If any of Bob’s girlfriends impressed me, it was Claire.
b. *If any of Bob’s girlfriends impressed me, she was Claire1.
It is well-known that clefts are interpreted exhaustively (see Hedberg 2000 and the
references cited therein), as shown by the contrast between (4a) and (4b):
(4) a. It was Paul who solved the problem. # And Mary did, too.
b. Paul solved the problem. And Mary did, too.
But if we combine this fact about the interpretation of clefts with standard as-
sumptions about the meaning of conditionals, it is completely unexpected that the
sentences in (1) have the readings paraphrased in (2). Rather, we would expect them
to only have readings that can be characterized along the following lines:
(A) The speaker at least implicates that she is not sure whether an entity exists
in the world of evaluation that satisfies the antecedent predicate, i.e. that is
hated by her, was drunk at last night’s party, etc.
(B) In all worlds that are epistemically accessible from the world of evaluation
(i.e. where everything that is known in the world of evaluation is true) and
where an entity that satisfies the antecedent predicate exists, the unique entity
that satisfies the antecedent predicate is identical to the individual referred to
by the post-copular DP.
Note that I am not claiming that the sentences in (1) do not have readings that can be
characterized along these lines (at least (1b) certainly does). The crucial point for
me is just that they also have prominent readings that can be paraphrased as in (2).
In this they contrast with the sentences in (5), which can only be interpreted along
1 The sentence is grammatical under a completely irrelevant and absurd reading, which in my view
is almost impossible to get, and which can roughly be paraphrased as follows: In all accessible
worlds where one of Bob’s girlfriends impressed me, some contextually salient female individual
was identical to Claire.
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the lines sketched in (A) and (B), i.e. (5a) is incompatible with a situation where
the speaker considers it possible that there is an individual apart from Peter that can
solve the problem under discussion, etc.
(5) a. If anyone solved this problem, it was Peter.
b. If Peter bought anything at the store, it was pizza.
Intuitively, this difference is due to the following fact: The antecedent predicates in
(1) are gradable, i.e. one can hate something to a higher or lesser degree, be drunk to
a higher or lesser degree, etc. The ones in (5), in contrast, are not: A problem is either
solved or not solved by someone, and something is either bought by an individual or
not bought. Now, with the exception of so-called absolute gradable adjectives like
full, open, wet or dry (see Kennedy 2007 for discussion)2, gradability of a predicate
results in vagueness concerning the standard with respect to which the respective
predicate is interpreted if it does not occur in combination with an explicit measure
phrase (or, in the case of gradable adjectives, with a comparative or superlative
morpheme). It is thus plausible to assume that the standard of interpretation is left
open in such cases and can be fixed by the context (cf. von Stechow 1984; Kennedy
1999, 2007; Barker 2002 on gradable adjectives). Consequently, the intensity of the
negative stance a person must have towards an entity in order for the pair consisting
of the person and the entity to be in the denotation of hate, for example, can vary
from context to context. As we will see below, it is this fact that allows us to give a
principled explanation of why the conditionals in (1) receive readings that are not
available for the ones in (5).
So while vagueness of the respective antecedent predicate is crucial for the
availability of the readings that are the main focus of this paper, another factor that
at first glance might seem to play a role as well can immediately be dismissed: the
presence of the Negative Polarity Item (henceforth: NPI) any in the antecedent of the
conditional. It is well-known that NPIs are licensed in the antecedents of conditionals
2 As Kennedy (2007) shows in detail, what distinguishes those adjectives from other gradable adjectives
is the fact that in order for an entity to fall under their denotation, it either suffices that it possesses
the relevant property to a minimal degree (i.e. a table is wet as soon as there are a few drops of water
on its surface), or it is required to possess the property to a maximal degree (i.e. a glass is only full if
it is completely filled). Kennedy shows that this special behavior of absolute gradable adjectives (i.e.
the absence of a context-sensitive interpretation in spite of their gradability) is due to the interplay of
two factors:
(i) the special nature of the scales with which they are associated: in contrast to the scales
associated with other gradable predicates, those scales have natural upper or lower bounds.
(ii) an interpretive principle which favors conventional meaning over context-dependent meaning.
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quite generally, despite the fact that conditional antecedents fail classical tests for
downward-entailingness (but see von Fintel 1999 for a modified version of the notion
of downward-entailingness that works for conditionals). This is also evidenced by
the examples in (5), which do not have readings of the kind under consideration,
but which contain any-DPs as well. Still, it is conceivable that while hardly being a
sufficient condition, the presence of any is a necessary condition nonetheless. This
cannot be the case, however, since the following variants of the examples in (1)
can also be interpreted as paraphrased in (2) (though some of the native speakers I
consulted judged them as slightly dispreferred):
(6) a. If I hate something, it’s bad acting.
b. If someone was drunk at last night’s party, it was Mary.
c. If some book impressed me, it was Ulysses.
In addition to that, the German equivalents of the examples in (1), which contain
‘ordinary’ indefinite pronouns/indefinite DPs instead of NPIs3, get the relevant
readings as easily as their English counterparts:
(7) a. Wenn
If
ich
I
etwas
something
hasse,
hate
ist
it
es
is
schlechte
bad
Schauspielerei.
acting.
b. Wenn
If
jemand
someone
auf
at
der
the
Party
party
gestern
yesterday
abend
evening
betrunken
drunk
war,
was
war
was
es
it
Maria.
Maria
c. Wenn
If
mich
me
ein
a
Buch
book
beeindruckt
impressed
hat,
has
war
was
es
it
Ulysses.
Ulysses
This shows clearly that the distribution of NPIs in the antecedents of conditionals,
while being an interesting topic in its own right, is independent of the question of
how the readings arise that that are our main concern in this paper.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses some additional data that
give us a clearer picture with respect to the question of which antecedent predicates
license the ‘unexpected readings’ under consideration. Section 3 spells out in a
little more detail what the ‘expected readings’ of the relevant examples are and how
they come about given standard assumptions about vague predicates, conditionals
and clefts. Section 4.1 briefly summarizes the main features of Barker’s (2002)
analysis of vague predicates, on which my own account is based, setting the stage
for a presentation of my analysis in section 4.2. Section 5 is the conclusion.
3 There is no equivalent of NPI-any in German.
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2 More data
In section 1 we have seen that the presence of gradable and thus vague predicates
(but see footnote 2 for qualification) is required in the antecedents of conditionals in
order for the ‘unexpected readings’ under discussion to arise. Since the predicates in
(1a) and (1c) are verbs, not adjectives, they cannot be combined with comparative
and superlative morphemes directly. Still, their gradability is evidenced by the
paraphrases in (2a) and (2c): The VP the respective verb heads is modified by the
adverb most, which is the superlative version of the adverb more, and its presence
in the VP intuitively has the same effect as the modification of the adjective drunk
by the superlative morpheme in (2b). (I will discuss the semantics of gradable
predicates in more detail in sections 3 and 4.)
Now consider the sentence in (8a), which likewise receives a prominent reading
of the kind under consideration (paraphrased in (8b))4: As the contrast in (8b)
shows, however, the verb understand in the antecedent predicate in (8a) cannot
felicitously be modified by most. Rather, the adverb best has to be chosen, which is
the superlative version of the adverb well.
(8) a. If anybody/somebody understands the work of Michael Haneke, it’s
Isabelle Huppert.
b. The one who understands the work of Michael Haneke best/??most is
Isabelle Huppert.
This contrast between the examples in (1), on the one hand, and the example in (8a),
on the other, is presumably due to the fact that gradable predicates are associated
with different dimensions that are mapped onto degrees (see section 4 below for
more details), and on which comparative and superlative morphemes or adverbs
performing parallel functions operate: In the case of the verbs hate and impress and
the adjective (be) drunk, it’s the pure intensity of a certain emotional or physical
state that a person is in. In the case of the verb understand, it’s much harder to pin
down the dimension to be manipulated, since even the choice of dimension seems to
depend on contextual factors: Intuitively, what seems to be at stake (in cases like the
one under consideration, where the object is a piece of art) are properties like being
able to integrate various parts into a coherent structure, having a clue as to what the
motivation of the artist is, etc. It might be this additional complexity and subjectivity
4 Note that in contrast to the sentences in (1), the paraphrased reading is not clearly the preferred one in
this case. Rather, interpreting the sentence in this way is just an available option, with the ‘expected
reading’ being another one, according to which the speaker is (a) not sure whether anyone exists at all
who understands the work of Michael Haneke, and (b) that in case such a person exists, it is identical
to Isabel Huppert. The choice between these two readings presumably depends on contextual factors
as well as on the hearer’s own stance towards the work of Michael Haneke.
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that is responsible for the fact that VPs headed by understand have to be modified
by the adverb best instead of most. Be that as it may, the important point for our
purposes is that the example in (8a) provides additional evidence for our hypothesis
that the gradability of the antecedent predicate is crucial for licensing the readings
under consideration.
But now consider the conditionals in (9), whose antecedents do not contain VPs
headed by verbs that qualify as gradable:
(9) a. If I read anything/something, it was Finnegan’s Wake.
b. If anybody/somebody is pregnant in this room, it’s Mary.
Still, (9a) can be uttered felicitously and truthfully by a speaker who is known (and
knows himself) to have read lots of books, and (9b) by a speaker who is known
(and knows himself) to be in a room with various pregnant woman. In other words,
they do not necessarily receive the expected readings either. But how can their
‘unexpected readings’ be characterized? Intuitive paraphrases are given in (10):
(10) a. The book I studied/thought about most intensely is Finnegan’s Wake.
b. The woman who shows the strongest/most obvious signs of pregnancy
in this room is Mary.
The paraphrases in (10) are structurally parallel to the paraphrases of our examples
containing gradable predicates. Intuitively, the difference is that in the examples
above gradability is part of the respective predicate’s lexical semantics, while in the
case of the sentences in (9) the basic denotation has to be modified: The predicates
come with (relatively) clear criteria specifying whether an entity falls under their
denotation or not, i.e. a woman satisfies the property of being pregnant as soon
as she has a fertilized egg cell in her uterus, and a person satisfies the property of
having read a book as soon as s/he has finished the last page. On the other hand,
there are associated predicates that individuals can be assumed to satisfy as soon as
they satisfy the respective original predicate, and at least some of these properties
are gradable: The belly of a pregnant woman grows bigger over the course of her
pregnancy, for example; reading a book is associated with thinking about its content,
etc.
Let us therefore assume that it is these associated gradable properties which
enable the sentences in (9a) and (9b) to receive their ‘unexpected readings’. I.e. the
original denotations of the respective antecedent predicates are shifted in such a way
that these properties are turned into criteria an individual necessarily has to satisfy
in order to fall under the denotation of the predicate. As soon as this has happened,
the same mechanism (which will be discussed in detail in section 4) can apply that
applies in the cases where the antecedent predicates are gradable to begin with.
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Now, of course, different properties can be selected in different contexts: While
the most obvious choice in the case of (9b), for example, is the property of having a
belly that grows bigger over the course of pregnancy, other choices are conceivable as
well. In a context where the assumption that pregnant woman tend to unpredictable
and undermotivated emotional outbursts is part of the interlocutors’ shared beliefs,
for example, and where Mary has just behaved in such a way, (9b) may well be
understood as follows: Mary is the one among the contextually salient pregnant
women that shows the irrational behavior which is assumed to be associated with
pregnancy in its most extreme form.
Let us finally turn to the sentence in (11), which can felicitously be uttered by a
speaker who is known (and knows himself) to have talked to various people at the
relevant party. This shows that it receives a reading of the kind we are interested in.
(11) If I talked to anybody/somebody at the party yesterday, it’s Paul.
The antecedent predicate is vague in the following sense: It is not clear how many
utterances one really needs to have exchanged with a person x in order for it to be
true that one has talked to x. What seems to be clear is that mutual greetings would
not be enough, but apart from that one does not have the feeling that it is possible to
define a lower threshold either in terms of the time spent together or the number of
utterances exchanged. It is thus not surprising that a natural paraphrase of (one of
the possible readings of) (11) involves manipulating the temporal dimension:
(12) The person I talked to longest at the party yesterday is Paul.
Interestingly, however, I have the clear intuition (which is shared by my informants)
that the sentence can even be true in a situation where the speaker has talked to
other people longer than to Paul, but where the other conversations were rather
superficial, and the one with Paul was the only one where really substantial issues
were discussed. Sticking to the schema adopted for the other examples under
discussion, the following paraphrase suggests itself for this way of interpreting the
sentence:
(13) The person I talked to most intensely at the party yesterday is Paul.
The availability of the reading paraphrased in (13) in addition to the one paraphrased
in (12) can be interpreted in two ways: According to the first one, it shows that
another dimension is involved in the original denotation of the verb talk to, which is
also vague and accordingly can be interpreted with respect to different standards in
different contexts. According to the second one, it shows that even a predicate that is
vague along a particular dimension qua lexical meaning can be shifted in a manner
that is parallel to the way the (initially) non-vague predicates in (9) can be shifted:
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Namely by turning an associated dimension into a part of the core lexical meaning.
At present, I do not see a way to decide between these two options, and simply
note that they are both compatible with the view adopted in this paper: Namely that
gradability (either qua lexical meaning or as a result of a shifting operation) of the
antecedent predicate is required in order for conditionals to receive the “unexpected
readings” under consideration. Before turning to my account of how these readings
actually arise, let us first get a clearer understanding of the way in which they deviate
from what we would expect to be the only available interpretations.
3 The ‘expected’ readings
According to the view shared by most (formal) semanticists, indicative condition-
als (very roughly) express universal quantification over those worlds where the
respective antecedent is true that are epistemically accessible from the world of
evaluation (Kratzer 1986; von Fintel 1997, 1999; Nolan 2003; cf. Stalnaker 1975 for
a slightly different, though related view). Since the question of whether this is due
to the meaning of if (as argued for by Gillies (2010)), or to the presence of a covert
epistemic operator with universal force (with if simply signaling that the CP it heads
is to be interpreted in the restrictor of an operator, as argued for by Kratzer (1986)),
is irrelevant for our present concerns, let us adopt the second option for concreteness
Kratzer (1981) assumes that modals in general do not only operate on modal
bases, i.e. on functions from possible worlds to sets of propositions, but that the set
of possible worlds where all the propositions in the modal base are true is further
restricted by an ordering source, where an ordering source is a set of propositions
that characterizes the world of evaluation in a certain respect. A modal thus quantifies
over those worlds where all the propositions in the modal base are true that conform
as much as possible to the description provided by the ordering source, i.e. that
make as many of the propositions in the ordering source true as possible.
Now, since indicative conditionals contain a (covert) epistemic modal with
universal force by assumption, their truth conditions can be characterized as follows.
Assuming that a stereotypical ordering source is employed by default, i.e. an ordering
source containing assumptions about the stereotypical course of events in the world of
evaluation: An indicative conditional with antecedent p and consequent q is true in a
world w iff in all those among the worlds where p is true and that are compatible with
what is known in w that conform as much as possible to stereotypical assumptions
about the course of events in w, q is true as well. This is given schematically in
(14c), with (14a) providing the formal definition of a strict partial order <P over a
set of propositions P, and (14b) the definition of the selection function maxP that
selects the set of <P-best worlds from any set X of worlds (see von Fintel & Iatridou
2005: 4f.).
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(14) a. ∀w′,w′′ : w′ <P w′′ iff ∀p ∈ P(w′′ ∈ p→ w′ ∈ p)∧∃p ∈ P(w′ ∈ p∧
w′′ /∈ p)
‘A world w′ is better than a world w′′ with respect to a set of proposi-
tions P iff all propositions in P that are true in w′′ are true in w′ as well,
and there is at least one proposition in P that is true in w′′, but not in w′.’
b. ∀X ⊆W : maxP(X) = {w ∈ X : ¬∃w′ ∈ X : w′ <P w}
‘The selection function maxP(X) selects the worlds from X that are
best with respect to P, i.e. that make as many of the proposition in P
true as possible.’
c. [[MUST if p,q]] f ,g = λw. ∀w′[w′ ∈ maxg(w)(∩( f (w))∩ [[p]])→ w′ ∈
[[q]])], where MUST is the covert counterpart of overt epistemic must,
f is the modal base, and g is the ordering source.
Before we can take a closer look at what this analysis gives us when it is applied
to the examples under consideration, we first need to consider vague predicates as
well as the contribution of the neuter pronoun it in the consequent of the conditional
in a little more detail. As already said above, gradable predicates are standardly
assumed to either denote relations between individuals and degrees to which those
individuals satisfy the respective predicates (von Stechow 1984; Kennedy 1999), or
as functions from individuals to measurements, i.e. the degrees to which they possess
the respective property (Kennedy 2007). Irrespective of which option is chosen, in
order to combine with their subject arguments, they need to be turned into functions
from individuals to truth values. Let us adopt the first option for the moment (but see
section 4 below), and follow von Stechow’s (1984) analysis of gradable adjectives.
Simplifying somewhat, von Stechow assumes that gradable adjectives like tall take
an additional degree argument, which can be saturated by measure phrases like three
inches or via the combination with comparative or superlative morphology.
Now, the crucial question for our purposes is of course what happens in those
cases where neither measure phrases nor comparative or superlative morphology is
present. According to von Stechow, the adjective in such cases is combined with
a covert morpheme pos, which introduces a standard of comparison in the form
of a free variable ds ranging over degrees whose value is fixed by the context. Let
us modify this analysis in such a way that it applies to transitive verbs, i.e. let us
assume that there is a related covert morpheme postr, which can be combined with
transitive verbs such as hate:
(15) a. [[postr]] = λ f<d,<e,<e,st>>>.λy.λx.λw. ∃d[ f (d)(y)(x)(w)∧d ≥ ds]
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b. [[hate]] = λd.λy.λx.λw. [hate(d)(y)(x)(w)]
c. [[postr - hate]] = λy.λx.λw. ∃d[hate(d)(y)(x)(w)∧d ≥ ds]
Let us now turn to the contribution of the neuter pronoun it. As already said in the
introduction, the obligatoriness of a neuter pronoun in the consequent of the condi-
tional indicates a cleft-like structure, and clefts are known to trigger exhaustiveness
effects. According to Hedberg (2000), this is due to the semantic contribution of it:
She assumes that it has the same meaning as the definite article, i.e. it is a function
from sets to individuals that is only defined for singletons, and returns the unique
member of the respective set. This, in combination with a syntactic analysis which
treats the cleft clause as forming a discontinuous constituent with the cleft subject
pronoun, accounts for the truth-conditional equivalence of a cleft sentence such as
(16a) with a sentence such as (16b): Applying the meaning of it to the predicate
denoted by the CP who stole the watch gives us the same semantic object as the one
we get by applying the meaning of the to the predicate denoted by the NP person
who stole the watch.
(16) a. It was Peter who stole the watch.
b. Peter is the person who stole the watch.
Let us follow Hedberg in assuming that the neuter pronoun in the conditionals under
consideration has the same denotation as the definite article. Let us furthermore
assume that it in these cases does not have a syntactic complement to combine with,
but rather comes with a free variable ranging over predicates which is resolved to
the most salient predicate in the context. Since the most salient predicate in our
examples is the one introduced in the antecedent of the respective conditional, the
free variable is resolved to it, and we get an interpretation according to which the
neuter pronoun denotes the unique individual satisfying the antecedent predicate
relative to each of the worlds quantified over.
Combining these assumptions with the ones about vague predicates and with the
analysis of indicative conditionals sketched above, we get (17b) as the denotation of
(1a), which is repeated here as (17a):
(17) a. If I hate anything, it’s bad acting.
b. λw. ∀w′[w′ ∈ maxg(w)(∩( f (w))∩
λw1. ∃d∃x[hate(d)(x)(speaker)(w1)∧d ≥ ds])→
w′ ∈ λw2. ιy[∃d[hate(d)(y)(speaker)(w2)∧d ≥ ds]] = bad_acting]
According to (17b), (17a) is thus true in a world of evaluation w iff every world that
is
a) compatible with everything that is known in w,
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b) conforms as much as possible to stereotypical assumptions about the course
of events in w, and where
c) there is an individual that the speaker hates to a degree that is at least as high
as the value that has been assigned to the free variable ds on the basis of
contextual information
is also a world where the unique individual that the speaker hates (at least) to the
contextually specified degree in that world is identical to bad acting.
As already mentioned in section 1, for the sentence to be true under this reading
in a world w there can be at most one entity that the speaker hates (at least) to the
contextually specified degree. In addition to that, by uttering the conditional in
(17a) instead of the sentence in (18), i.e. by invoking universal quantification over
epistemically accessible (and stereotypical) worlds instead of making a direct claim
about the world of evaluation, the speaker at least strongly implicates that she is not
sure whether there actually is an entity in the world of evaluation that she hates to
the contextually specified degree.
(18) I hate bad acting.
Now, since people can (at least in ordinary circumstances) be assumed to know about
(the intensity of) their own feelings, this reading is strongly dispreferred for (17a),
and the sentence accordingly is much more likely to receive a reading of the kind
that will be dealt with in detail in section 4. The same holds for (1c) (repeated here
as (19a)), but (1b) and (8a) (repeated here as (19b) and (19c) may well be interpreted
along the lines just sketched if the context does not suggest otherwise.
(19) a. If any book impressed me, it was Ulysses.
b. If anyone was drunk at last night’s party, it was Mary.
c. If anybody/somebody understands the work of Michael Haneke, it’s
Isabelle Huppert.
Concerning (19b), for example, it is easy to imagine a situation where the speaker
(a) is not sure whether anyone drank enough at the party under discussion to qualify
as being drunk according to the contextually specified standard, but (b) Mary is the
only one among the guests she considers capable of such a behavior. Likewise, (19c)
may well be uttered by someone who thinks (a) that the work of Michael Haneke
is so obscure that possibly nobody understands it at all, but (b) that Isabel Huppert
is the only one whose hermeneutic capabilities are so extraordinary that she might
even succeed in this case.
In this section we have seen in detail what readings we get for the sentences
introduced in sections 1 and 2 if we combine standard assumptions about the seman-
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tics of conditionals, vague predicates and clefts. In addition to that, I have shown
that at least in some cases these readings are actually available options that might
even be favored by the context. Consequently, there seems to be a real ambiguity
between the readings discussed in this section and the ones sketched in sections 1
and 2. Intuitively, what is at stake is whether the standard of interpretation for the
respective antecedent predicate is fixed by the context for all the worlds quantified
over by the conditional, or whether it is possible to quantify over worlds that differ
from the world of evaluation with respect to the standard of interpretation for the
antecedent predicate. The analysis of vague predicates discussed in this section only
allowed for the first option, thus resulting in readings according to which actual
states of affairs, and not standards of interpretation are at issue. In the next section
we will discuss a more flexible approach that is at least in principle compatible with
the second option.
4 The ‘unexpected’ readings
4.1 Barker’s (2002) analysis of vague predicates
The starting point for Barker (2002) is the observation that a sentence such as (20)
can not only be used to convey information about Feynman’s height, but also to
“communicate something about how to use a certain word appropriately” (Barker
2002: 2) – for example in a situation where Feynman’s height is common knowledge,
but where the speaker has been asked what counts as tall in her country.
(20) Feynman is tall.
(Barker 2002: 2, ex. (1))
Barker calls such uses ‘metalinguistic uses’, and the task of his analysis is to account
for both these uses and descriptive uses where the speaker conveys information about
extralinguistic states of affairs within a single framework. In order to achieve this
goal, Barker adopts a dynamic approach to meaning which models the shared beliefs
of the discourse participants as a set of propositions whose intersection gives the
set of worlds that are compatible with everything that both speaker and hearer(s)
believe (Stalnaker 1973; Karttunen 1974; Heim 1982, 1983). This set of worlds,
each of whose members represents an alternative way the world could be like given
the shared beliefs of speaker and hearer(s), is called the context set (henceforth: C).
The assertion of a proposition α then has the effect of mapping C to the subset that
is compatible with α by eliminating from C all worlds in which α is not true, i.e. C
is in effect intersected with the set of worlds where α is true, resulting in C′.
What is crucial for our purposes is that Barker enriches this system in the
following way: He assumes a special delineation function d which when it is applied
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to a world c in the context set C and to a vague predicate α returns the standard that
is associated with α in c. Just like in the analysis sketched in section 3, this standard
is conceived of as the minimal degree to which an individual has to satisfy a certain
predicate in order to fall under the denotation of this predicate, i.e. the minimal
degree to which an individual has to be tall in order to count as (absolute) tall, for
example. An adjective such as tall is then interpreted as shown in (21a), and the
example (20) receives the denotation in (21b):
(21) a. [[tall]] = λC. {c ∈C : c ∈ tall(d(c)([[tall]]),x)} (Barker 2002: 7, ex.
(5))
b. λC. {c ∈C : c ∈ tall(d(c)([[tall]]), f )} (Barker 2002: 8, ex. (6b)),
where f is the individual named Feynman.
Depending on the context, the assertion of (21b) either has the effect of excluding
worlds from the initial context set on the basis of Feynman’s height, or on the basis
of the interpretation standard that is in effect for the predicate tall: Consider first the
case where Feynman’s actual height is not known among the discourse participants,
while the interpretation standard for tall is fixed. In this case, the worlds in C
differ with respect to Feynman’s height, but they agree on the degree denoted by
d(c)([[tall]]). Consequently, as soon as (21b) has been asserted, all worlds where the
maximal degree to which Feynman is tall is below that degree are excluded from C.
This corresponds to the descriptive use.
Consider next the case where Feynman’s height is common knowledge among
the discourse participants, while the interpretation standard for tall is not fixed. In
this case, the worlds in C agree on the maximal degree to which Feynman is tall,
while they differ with respect to the degree denoted by d(c)([[tall]]). Consequently,
as soon as (21b) has been asserted, all worlds where this degree is higher than the
maximal degree to which Feynman is tall are excluded from C. This corresponds to
the metalinguistic use.
What makes this analysis attractive for our purposes is the fact that it allows the
standard of interpretation that is associated with a vague predicate to vary across
worlds. Let us see what it can actually do for us with respect to the ‘unexpected
readings’ under consideration.
4.2 The analysis
Recall that we need to account for the fact that sentences like those in (17a) and (19)
(repeated here as (22a)-(22d)) have prominent readings that can be paraphrased as
in (23):
(22) a. If I hate anything, it’s bad acting.
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b. If any book impressed me, it was Ulysses.
c. If anyone was drunk at last night’s party, it was Mary.
d. If anybody/somebody understands the work of Michael Haneke, it’s
Isabelle Huppert.
(23) a. What I hate most is bad acting.
b. The book that impressed me most was Ulysses.
c. The drunkest person at last night’s party was Mary.
d. The one who understands the work of Michael Haneke best is Isabelle
Huppert.
As already said above, what we would need in order to account for these readings is
a way to manipulate the standards according to which the antecedent predicates are
interpreted in such a way that we quantify over worlds that do not (possibly) differ
from the world where the sentences are uttered with respect to some extralinguistic
state of affairs, but only in the following way: The standards of interpretation have
been raised so much as to prevent all entities from satisfying the predicates but the
ones that satisfy them to the highest degree. I.e. in the case of (22a), for example,
the degree d to which a person x needs to hate an entity y at least in order for the
triple < x,y,d > to fall under the denotation of hate must be set so high that there is
only one entity of which it can be said that it is hated by x.
Now, as we have seen in section 4.1, Barker’s system in principle allows us to
perform the required manipulations, since it allows predicates to be associated with
different standards in different worlds. There seems to be a rather straightforward
way to get what we want: We could simply stipulate that in the cases at hand the
covert modal quantifies only over those epistemically accessible worlds (that are
best with respect to a stereotypical ordering source) where the standard associated
with the antecedent predicate has been raised to the maximal value that is considered
as a candidate in the respective context. A sentence such as (22a) would thus be
interpreted as given in (24):
(24) λC. {c ∈C : ∀c′[c′ ∈ maxg(c)({c′′ : c′′ ∈ ∩( f (c))∧d(c′′)([[hate]]) = dmax∧
∃x[hate(d(c′′)([[hate]]),sp,x)(c′′)]})→ ιy[hate(d(c′)([[hate]]),sp,y)(c′)]=
bad_acting]}
‘All worlds c′ that are (a) epistemically accessible from the worlds in the
context set, that are (b) best with respect to a stereotypical ordering source,
in which (c) d(c′)([[hate]]) is set to the maximal value and in which there
(still) is some entity such that the speaker hates this entity (at least) to the
degree corresponding to d(c′)([[hate]]), the unique entity that the speaker
hates (at least) to the degree corresponding to d(c′)([[hate]]) is identical to
bad acting.’
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At first sight, this solution looks not too bad. It raises at least two serious problems,
though. First, it is not at all clear why we should be allowed to enrich the predicate
restricting the covert modal in this way, i.e. why (and at which level) the conjunct
d(c)([[hate]]) = dmax is inserted. Second, it is not clear how we can ensure that dmax
is exactly the degree that we need, i.e. the one that filters out all but the one entity
that the speaker hates to the highest degree. Why shouldn’t it be the case that the
highest degree that is considered as a plausible candidate for d(c)([[hate]]) in the
relevant context is one according to which there are two, three, or even more entities
that the speaker hates to a degree that is at least as high? Dropping the assumption
that dmax can only be set to a degree that is considered as a plausible candidate in
the respective context would make matters even worse, for then there would be no
worlds for the covert modal to quantify over, and the sentence would be vacuously
true: Sadly enough, there does not seem to be an upper bound for the intensity with
which someone or something can be hated, so dmax would be undefined, and there
simply wouldn’t be any worlds that satisfy the restriction of the modal operator.
There is a further aspect of the strategy just sketched that is problematic, but
which is also brought up by the solution I will propose below, and therefore needs
to be dealt with anyway: As already said in sections 1 and 2, the sentences under
consideration can be uttered in situations where it is common knowledge among the
discourse participants that there are other entities that satisfy the respective predicate
(after all, this was one of the observations that motivated the analysis to be proposed
in this section). The sentence in (22a), for example, can be uttered even if it is
common knowledge among the discourse participants that the speaker hates other
things. In present terms, this means that (the denotation of) the sentence can be
applied to a context set from which all worlds c have been eliminated in which the
value of d(c)([[hate]]) is too high for those other things to be considered as entities
that are hated by the speaker.
But what consequences does this have for the worlds quantified over by the
covert modal? Since the modal base f is epistemic by assumption, it returns for
each world c in the context set the set of propositions that are known in c. Now, the
crucial question is whether this set of propositions also contains knowledge about
the standards of interpretation for vague predicates in c. If this was the case, ∩( f (c))
would contain only worlds c′ where d(c)([[hate]]) is identical to d(c)([[hate]]). This,
however, would mean that there were now worlds c′ in ∩( f (c)) where it is true that
d(c′)([[hate]]) is identical to dmax, simply because the context set C does not contain
any worlds c where d(c)([[hate]]) is identical to dmax. Consequently, there wouldn’t
be any worlds for the covert modal to quantify over, and the sentence would come
out as vacuously true again.
While the problem just outlined could simply be seen as a further argument
against the analysis under consideration, the problem is more general, since it affects
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any analysis that allows the standard of interpretation associated with the antecedent
predicate to be higher in the worlds quantified over by the covert modal than in
the worlds of the context set. But this is exactly what we need! Let us therefore
assume that it is at least possible for the modal base introduced by the covert
epistemic operator in conditionals to exclude knowledge concerning the standards
of interpretation associated with vague predicates in a world c from the set of
propositions to which it maps c. Consequently, ∩( f (c)) is allowed to contain worlds
where the standards of interpretation associated with vague predicates are higher or
lower than in c. Since it is well-known that a proper understanding of utterances
containing modals in general requires some flexibility with respect to the question
of which aspects of the contexts in which they are uttered may be ignored, and since
metalinguistic knowledge concerning the standards of interpretation associated with
vague predicates is a quite special and clearly delineated kind of knowledge, this
seems to be a legitimate option.
A further fact that seems relevant for the question of whether knowledge con-
cerning the standards of interpretation associated with vague predicates may be
excluded from the modal base is the behavior of subjunctive conditionals with re-
spect to the availability of the readings under consideration. Consider the subjunctive
counterparts of the conditionals from (22) above:
(25) a. If I hated anything, it would be bad acting.
b. If any book had impressed me, it would have been Ulysses.
c. If anyone had been drunk at last night’s party, it would have been
Mary.
d. If anybody/somebody understood the work of Michael Haneke, it
would be Isabelle Huppert.
Interestingly, none of the sentences in (25) receives an ‘unexpected reading’, i.e.
a reading that can be paraphrased as in (23). Rather, they all strongly suggest that
the state of affairs corresponding to the antecedent does not hold in the world of
evaluation, i.e. that there is nothing the speaker hates, no book that impressed
her, etc. Now, according to a (in my view) very plausible assumption about the
semantic impact of subjunctive vs. indicative marking in conditionals that goes back
to Stalnaker (1968), the worlds where the antecedent is true are required to (a) lie
outside of the context set, and (b) be as similar as possible to the world of evaluation
as is allowed by the truth of the antecedent predicate in them. In terms of the theory
of conditionals adopted in this paper, this means that the modal base is empty in
the case of subjunctive conditionals (i.e. all possible worlds where the antecedent
predicate is true are allowed), while the ordering source orders the worlds it operates
on according to their overall similarity to the world of evaluation.
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Now, if excluding knowledge concerning the standards of interpretation as-
sociated with vague predicates was not allowed for the modal base employed in
indicative conditionals, choosing the subjunctive counterpart of the respective condi-
tional would be the natural option for expressing the intended meaning. After all, the
intended reading involves quantification over worlds that differ from the worlds in
the context set only insofar as the standard of interpretation associated with a certain
vague predicate has been raised. I therefore take the fact that the sentences in (25)
in contrast to their indicative counterparts do not receive metalinguistic readings to
be an indication that it is allowed to exclude knowledge concerning the standard
of interpretation associated with vague predicates from the set of propositions the
modal base in indicatives assigns to a world. Hence, there is no competition between
indicatives and subjunctives with respect to that matter, and choosing a subjunctive
instead of an indicative is automatically taken to indicate that the worlds where the
antecedent is true differ from the worlds in the context set with respect to an actual
state of affairs, and not simply with respect to the standard according to which the
vague predicate is interpreted.
Following the analysis sketched above, the sentences in (25) are thus interpreted
as follows: Since the modal base is empty by assumption, we get the set of all
possible worlds where the speaker hates an entity according to some conceivable
standard of interpretation. Since the selection function picks only those worlds from
that set that are maximally similar to the world of evaluation, all surviving worlds
are such that the standard of interpretation associated with the respective predicate
is the same as in the word of evaluation. Consequently, the sentence in (25a), for
example, at least strongly implicates that it is incompatible with the context that
there is an entity that the speaker hates at least to the contextually relevant degree,
and likewise for the other examples.
Let us now return to the question of how we can account for the metalinguistic
readings of the indicative conditionals in (22). Intuitively, we want the covert modal
to quantify over worlds that only differ from the world of evaluation in the following
way: The standard of interpretation associated with the respective predicate has been
set to a value that is so high that it filters out all entities but the one that satisfies the
predicate to the highest degree in the world of evaluation, but not higher. But how
can this be ensured? The idea I would like to pursue is that we employ the selection
function to achieve this goal: Instead of picking out worlds that are best with respect
to a stereotypical (or some other) ordering source, i.e. satisfy as many propositions
as possible from the ordering source, it picks out worlds that are best in terms of
the strictness that is applied to the interpretation of vague predicates. Concerning
the case of the verb hate, for example, the selection function would pick out those
worlds c′ where d(c)([[hate]]) is highest.
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Recall that we allow the epistemic modal base to ignore the standards of in-
terpretation that are associated with vague predicates in the respective context.
Accordingly, the selection function operates on all words c′ that are (a) compatible
with what is known in the respective world c from the context set apart from the stan-
dard of interpretation associated with vague predicates, and where (b) the antecedent
of the conditional is true. Note that the required compatibility with everything else
that is known in c in combination with the existential quantifier in the antecedent
automatically sets an upper limit for the standard associated with the respective
antecedent predicate. To see this, consider the case of (22a): Since only worlds
c′ are allowed where the actual relations holding between entities and degrees are
compatible with what is known in c, and since the antecedent requires there to be
at least one entity that the speaker hates (at least) to the degree corresponding to
d(c′)([[hate]]), no world is allowed where d(c′)([[hate]]) is higher than the highest
degree for which (it is known that) there is an entity x in c such that the speaker
hates x to the degree corresponding to d(c′)([[hate]]) in c. The selection function
then picks out those worlds c′ where d(c′)([[hate]]) is set to the degree to which the
speaker hates the entity that she hates most in the respective world c in the context
set. This gives us exactly what we want, and avoids the problems with finding the
right value for dmax discussed above.
The definition for a strict partial order over standards of interpretation for vague
predicates that orders worlds according to how strict they apply those standards is
given in (26a), and the corresponding selection function is defined in (26b).
(26) a. ∀c′,c′′ : c′ <dP c′′ iff d(c′)(P)> d(c′′)(P)
b. ∀C ⊆C : maxdP(C′) = {c ∈C′ : ¬∃c′ ∈C′ : c′ <dP c}
Taking everything together, we get (27b) as the formal representation of the metalin-
guistic interpretation of the sentence in (22a), which is repeated here as (27a):
(27) a. If I hate anything, it’s bad acting.
b. λC. {c ∈C : ∀c′[c′ ∈ maxd[[hate]]({c′′ : c′′ ∈ ∩( f−(c))∧
∃x[hate(d(c′′)([[hate]]),sp,x)(c′′)]})→
ιy[hate(d(c′)([[hate]]),sp,y)(c′)] = bad_acting]},
where f− is the modal base that results from excluding knowledge
concerning the standards of interpretation of vague predicates from the
epistemic modal base f .
‘In all worlds c′ that are (a) epistemically accessible from the worlds in the context
set, apart from the fact that the standards of interpretation that are associated with
vague predicates may differ from the ones in those worlds, where (b) the verb
hate is interpreted according to the strictest standard that is possible, and where
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(c) there is some entity such that the speaker hates this entity at least to the degree
corresponding to d(c′)([[hate]]), the unique entity that the speaker hates at least to
the degree corresponding to d(c′)([[hate]]) is identical to bad acting.’
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that indicative conditionals whose antecedents contain
vague predicates (and predicates whose denotations can be shifted in such a way that
they become vague) under certain conditions are capable of receiving metalinguistic
readings, i.e. readings according to which the worlds quantified over do not (possi-
bly) differ from the world of evaluation with respect to some (extralinguistic) state
of affairs, but only with respect to the standards according to which those vague
predicates are interpreted – they can be set to values that are higher than the ones
that are in effect in the worlds of evaluation. Under these readings, the sentences are
equivalent to ones stating which individuals satisfy the respective predicate to the
highest degree in the world of evaluation.
I have argued that the metalinguistic readings come about as the result of an
interplay of the following factors: First, it is possible to exclude the standards of
interpretation for vague predicates from the epistemic modal base that is assigned to
the world of evaluation. Secondly, the selection function operating on the intersection
of the sets of worlds in the modal base may not only pick out worlds that are best
with respect to a stereotypical (or some other) ordering source, but may also pick
out worlds that are best with respect to how strict the standards are that they apply to
the interpretation of vague predicates.
This proposal raises a number of issues which need further exploration, but
which are beyond the scope of this paper, and therefore have to be left as questions
for future research: First, are there other kinds of information that can be excluded
from epistemic modal bases? Second, what is the exact nature of the discourse
conditions that license the metalinguistic readings under discussion? Third, what are
the conditions determining whether a non-gradable predicate can be re-interpreted
as a gradable one?
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